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For a sovereign power to label someone or something a “threat,” especially 
a national one, typically means to situate it beyond the realm of normal politics 
and within a state of exception. In critical security studies, this process by which 
a state discerns and designates threats is known as securitization (C.A.S.E. Collec-
tive 2006). While this framing is broad enough to account for operations of state 
power in a diverse range of circumstances, it overlooks two related possibilities, 
both of which are quintessential features of revolutions, and both of which help 
broaden our understanding of securitization. The first is the possibility that people 
can willfully excise themselves from so-called normal politics and, in doing so, 
knowingly become threats. The second is the possibility that securitization is not 
just something that states do to their subjects but also something that subjects do 
to states. Both possibilities define a distinctly revolutionary form of securitization.
SECURITIZING A REVOLUTION
When revolution erupted in Yemen in 2011, as conspicuous as the event was 
the speed of its condemnation. As hundreds of thousands of people poured into 
streets across the nation, feeling jubilant and empowered, political analysts spoke 
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of a “political crisis,” foreign officials expressed “concern,” and skeptics warned of 
impending “chaos.” The register and content of these reactions—by academics, 
policy think tanks, diplomats, and the regime itself—was remarkably consistent. 
As the new revolutionaries set up encampments in Yemen’s three main cities of 
Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden, political forecasts remained characteristically Hobbesian: 
without the state to mediate Yemenis in their rights and duties, “terrorism” would 
spread, “vacuums” would be filled by “illegitimate non-state actors,” and tribes 
would inevitably feud. Meanwhile, President Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to remind 
everyone of the achievements of his three-decade rule—“security, stability, unity, 
and constitutional legitimacy”—while also warning, in the same breath, of an in-
nate propensity for violence among Yemenis. 
No sooner had the revolution been diagnosed as a political crisis than inter-
national mediators arrived in Sana’a calling for a political solution, by which they 
meant talks. General consensus among this mediating elite held that the popular 
will, as articulated in the streets (“the people want . . . ”), urgently needed to be 
channeled into a formalized space of political deliberation and style of reasoning 
congenial to the common good. Where, they asked, were the men and women 
who would be ready to behave in a civil manner around their enemies at the ne-
gotiating table and contain the volatility of what Edmund Burke (2003, 2) warned 
of, in the French Revolution, as the “wild gas” of the “spirit of liberty”? Saleh, too, 
called on the new revolutionaries to consider the political option, pleading with 
them, condescendingly, to organize themselves and elect representatives. Mean-
while, state-run news agencies spread word of the unprecedented national threat; 
Saleh declared a state of emergency and security forces swiftly descended into the 
encampments.
A Willing Threat
It is significant that the revolutionaries proceeded into the domain of the 
exception fully cognizant of the fate that awaited them. They knew that in the mo-
ment of announcing themselves as revolutionaries (thuwār), the state and its allies 
would cast them as “traitors” and “terrorists,” threats to national security, beyond 
the realm of normal politics and subject to extrajudicial procedures. They knew 
this because they knew the regime, its methods, and what to expect. This will-
ingness to assume the role of threat proves significant because it unsettles the idea 
that people who are the objects of securitization must inevitably be understood 
as its subjects and, by extension, on the basis of their insecurity. By contrast, an 
assertive and conscious willingness to become a threat evinces a certain degree of 
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power, sovereignty, and ideology, more reminiscent of the securitizer than the se-
curitized. The revolutionary individual, in this case, is the self-empowered object 
of state securitization. Such individuals will willfully extricate themselves from 
the state’s political and legal norms and, in doing so, realize a different notion of 
what it means to be secure—one based, in turn, on a different notion of what it 
means to be political. I will work back to this point in what follows.
From Existential Threat to Existential Capacity
Between 2011 and 2013, I conducted fieldwork in a revolutionary encamp-
ment in central Sana’a, known as Change Square. Spread across five miles of 
inner-city streets, this area was home to tens of thousands of people for nearly 
three years. I use the word home partly because of the camp’s permanency: tim-
ber-framed structures with breeze-block foundations, sleeping compartments, and 
electricity supplies powering satellite dishes and televisions; a market, a hospital, 
wash blocks, restaurants; seminars and training courses; art galleries; a stage; even 
a defected army brigade. But beyond the physicality of spatial belonging, home 
evokes an intimacy between revolutionary self and revolutionary world that, in 
turn, evinces a particular expression of security. 
The defining experience of becoming and identifying as a revolutionary in-
dividual was one of rupture between two ways of life. Each of these existences 
evoke, for this same individual, a different dynamic of securitization, one that is 
incapacitating (as a securitized subject), and another that is liberating (as a secu-
ritizer of sorts). Beginning with the former, revolutionary reflections on prerev-
olutionary life typically amounted to an expression of subjugation to a coercive 
sovereign entity. By subjugation, I mean not only brute force but also a life marred 
by constant moral compromise, unrealizable aspirations, tragic choices, and the 
kind of uncertainty that follows from the arbitrary casting of threats. By contrast, 
the new revolutionaries appeared strikingly indifferent to the securitizing agenda 
of the state, despite the latter’s intensification of violence following the eruption 
of revolution. The revolutionaries found it farcical that they were deemed ter-
rorists, traitors, and general proponents of crisis and chaos. In their minds, they 
were the “the free revolutionaries,” with freedom pertaining to an unprecedent-
edly self-empowered and sovereign relation to the regime. The effect of this new 
relation would in turn strip the regime of political legitimacy in the eyes of many 
of its supporters, redistributing it to the revolution. It is in this redistribution of 
political legitimacy, and indeed possibility, that we may think about revolution as 
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a form of securitization in its own right. Let us consider a few expressions of what 
this rupture looked like in practice.
Outwitting the State
Few acts were considered as revolutionary as marching unarmed into gun-
fire during demonstrations. A typical scene unfolded as follows: thousands of pro-
testors leave Change Square and march through the surrounding streets singing, 
chanting, and carrying portraits of martyrs from previous demonstrations. Then, 
seeing a military barricade in the distance or finding themselves ambushed at a 
junction, the crowds would descend into the breach as machine guns rattled to 
life, arms wide open and shouting, “we’re peaceful.” 
This act became celebrated as the defining symbol of a revolution primarily 
because it served to reconfigure the relationship between securitizer and securi-
tized. Many of the individuals heading for the barricades had come to the revo-
lution following a lifetime of conflict with the regime—a conflict in which they 
had felt perpetually provoked into using violence as part of a carefully orchestrated 
political strategy of divide and rule. They knew that their own use of violence had 
played into Saleh’s hands to instantiate his position, both locally and internation-
ally, as the guardian of national security. Precisely the knowledge that they had 
been complicit in their own securitization made marching unarmed into gunfire 
such an immensely appealing, even liberating, act. Heading for the barricades with 
their “bare chests,” as they would say, the revolutionaries now confronted their 
adversary in a way that both refused to play into its hands and culminated in a dis-
tinctly novel sensation of freedom and moral autonomy. The act also exposed, in 
stark relief, the illegitimacy of the regime’s use of violence and a radically contrast-
ing image of political (and moral) legitimacy now forming around the revolution. 
It is in this sense that we may allude to revolutionary securitization as the process 
by which agents of a state unexpectedly find themselves without place or future in 
a radically alterative and expanding demarcation of the political.
Egalitarian Commitments
Several miles of streets in the heart of a bustling capital city are covered in 
tents. In each, thirty or more individuals are deep in the throes of argument and 
debate. They point fingers at their neighbors, accusing one another of adherence 
to extraneous ideologies and political preferences. People walk from tent to tent 
throwing bundles of flyers through doorways, advertising the true intentions of 
their fellow revolutionaries. Accusations circulate about an attempt to forsake the 
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will of the people and of a plot to hijack the revolution. Chants against political 
parties emanate from a crowd near the central stage. A banner hangs across the 
street: “No to individual rule.” In the newspaper Voice of the Revolution, a jour-
nalist writes that no one represents the revolution, that no individual can or will 
speak for the people. An organization is founded to disorganize organizations seek-
ing to organize the revolution.
If marching unarmed into gunfire was about upholding an unprovoked and 
desecuritized moral and political self in the face of the state, then within Change 
Square, an ethos of mistrust constituted the primary means of its maintenance. 
Throughout the camp, suspicions abounded regarding an elusive enemy in the rev-
olutionaries’ midst—an individual, party, or group that, at any moment, would 
surreptitiously impose its will on “the people” and re-engineer state securitization 
under a new (potentially revolutionary) banner. To avoid this possibility and ensure 
that power be kept diffuse and distributed, the only individuals universally trusted 
as leaders at Change Square were those who could satisfactorily demonstrate, typ-
ically through spectacles of selflessness and self-sacrifice, the innocence of their 
will vis-à-vis the will of the people. Hence the exalted status of the martyrs. It 
appears curious, however, that the revolutionaries situated this seemingly antistate 
egalitarian logic within their own vision of a (revolutionary) state. In this ideal, 
the role of the “citizen” is to diffuse the rise of concentrated power, ensuring that 
power is the people (in an ontological rather than representational sense). The 
state thus comes to look very un-stately. And yet, in revolutionary theory, it is a 
state nonetheless—only one premised on the selfless exploits of its proponents and 
the simultaneous delegitimization of an authoritarian rival.
For a Crisis of Politics
Considering the importance attached to safeguarding the revolutionary pres-
ent against the specter of the past, and specifically a past in which state securiti-
zation had been dressed in politically neutralizing garb (e.g., “stability”), it seems 
hardly surprising that calls by international mediators for reconciliation, dialogue, 
and negotiation (“political solutions”) fell on deaf ears. On the first day of the 
UN-brokered National Dialogue Conference in 2013, crowds left Change Square 
carrying pictures of martyrs with the slogan, “Only this list represents us in the 
Dialogue.” Others from the camp (“youth” who had acquired a certain amount 
of trust) tentatively participated in proceedings, testing their suspicions, only to 
encounter individuals vying for supremacy and pushing their minoritizing visions 
of a future state. In the following years, intrarevolutionary mistrust would mutate 
SECURITY AGAINST THE STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY YEMEN
209
into the war now raging in Yemen. If there is any continuity between the early 
revolutionary days of Change Square and the current period, it is the suspicion we 
find toward seemingly amicable invitations to politics and the securitizing agendas 
they conceal. It is in this vein that we may think about political crisis not just as a 
diagnostic for the absence of security but also as the direct result of people taking 
security into their own hands.
CONCLUSION
Anthropologists can productively contribute to conversations about securiti-
zation by bringing the concept into conversation with a diverse range of circum-
stances and, in doing so, gauging the extent to which the concept can be extended 
or pluralized. One such conversation thinks about security from below—security 
“subverted from its original meaning and captured from the state,” (El Dardiry 
and Hermez 2020, 199) as the editors of this colloquy put it. If anthropologists 
are to take up this challenge, however, they must first redress their preoccupation 
with the victims of state securitization with a focus on non-state securitizers. To 
allow for this redress, they must entertain the notion that people who are the 
intended objects of state securitization are not, necessarily, best understood as its 
insecure subjects.
Thinking about how people take security into their own hands can lead us in 
a number of directions. One route will consider how people (willfully or not) do 
the security work of the state. Darryl Li’s (2020) piece highlights the importance 
of ethnography for humanizing agents of state securitization and, by extension, 
catalyzing a nascent anthropology of the “enemy.” Another considers how people 
securitize themselves and others on behalf of the state, or do so to make up for 
the failure of the state. We see the latter expression in Kali Rubaii’s (2020) dis-
cussion, where she illustrates the ethical work that goes into sustaining human 
life in times of extreme suffering and risk. Another direction, which I have taken 
up here, examines how security is deployed against the state from a position of 
relative autonomy. 
The Yemeni revolution could be considered a security event punctuating a 
life of state-induced insecurity. Revolutionary securitization marks a momentary 
escape from what Diana Allan (2020) describes as a life marred by perpetual in-
security, where insecurity is not merely a blip but an enduring state of subjec-
tion to the relentless “dehumanizing objectifications of neoliberal statecraft.” The 
eventfulness of security, in this case, is constituted by a willed excision from the 
political norms of the state and the simultaneous embodiment of a rival sovereign 
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formation. The effect of this excision and embodiment in the Yemeni revolution 
was to momentarily render inert the securitizing machinations of an authoritar-
ian state through the cultivation of a more virtuous and liberating “state” of one’s 
own. We find subtle echoes here of what Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Ped-
ersen (2012) refer to, in the Cuban case, as “revolutionary securitization,” defined 
as the virtuous ontological fusion between oneself and one’s legitimate political 
forms. At Change Square, it was specifically the work that went into defending the 
sovereignty of one’s own, legitimate, political sphere that defined a revolutionary 
process of securitization. Yet in its subversion from its original meaning, revolu-
tion constitutes a form of security that remains largely invisible to the analyst, or 
politician, for whom the eclipse of the state (in its narrow definition) spells the 
absence of security.
ABSTRACT
What does security look like when it is deployed against rather than by the state? 
Focusing on the 2011 revolution in Yemen, this essay hints at a number of ways in 
which the revolutionaries sought to outwit the machinations of state securitization by 
taking security into their own hands. [Yemen; security; revolution; trust]
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